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It is not necessary, even though it would be interesting, to discuss further the varia-
tions and agreements of the two editions. In general it is enough to say that this new
edition is a scholarly and usable work, and that neither the instructor nor the practi-
tioner in the important field of law with which it deals can afford to work without it.
HARRY A. BIGELOW*
The Cheyenne Way: Conflict and Case Law in Primitive Jurisprudence.t By K. N.
Llewellynt and E. Adamson Hoebel.§ Norman: University of Oklahoma Press,
1941. Pp. ix, 360. $3.00.
Karl Llewellyn and Adamson Hoebel are bold men. They set out to capture the law-
ways of a folk far removed in culture, economy, intellectual climate-and fifty-three
full cases, with scraps of material from about as many others, are all they have to go
on. The reach is not bad; for, few as they are, the cases present tension and conflict in
almost every aspect of tribal life. The span of time, 182o-i88o, will do; it is long enough
to capture a flux which one can chart by the instances. But at no point of stress do the
cases come thick and fast enough to give sharp edges to any type of judgment. Worst
of all, not one is a case of official record; the whole docket has to be accepted on the
basis of hearsay. A more conventional pair of scholars would have obeyed the propri-
eties and have thrown up the job.
But not these pioneer adventurers. A neophyte, stumped at interpretation, seeks
more and more materials until he is smothered beneath the heap. A canny craftsman
devises techniques for drawing forth significance from the scanty stuff at hand. It is
a superb workmanship which makes this venture possible and endows its result with
quality. Llewellyn is a lawyer who sees in his subject, not a brooding omnipresence
to be brought down from the skies for dialectics only, but a going institution shaped to
the needs of its society. Hoebel is an anthropologist who understands that any item
turned up in field work draws its meaning from uses dictated by the impinging culture.
Where the one discipline is stopped, the other may provide a hunch; where the one
plunges recklessly ahead, the other is there to impose a check. And where either alone
is impotent, the two together may provide a fresh set of tools.
Men less wise about their crafts would have been balked by the hearsay. The au-
thors tapped the stream of decision not as cases came, but nearly sixty years after the
last doom was spoken. The judgments were passed on by word of mouth; along the
way many minds and tongues could intrude to corrupt the unwritten text. Yet, the
materials used are hardly less reliable than cases of record. Literacy is unable to insure
the integrity of utterance; it has contrived no device by which meaning can be insu-
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lated against pervading opinion. The case of Man Lying on His Back with His Legs
Flexed, as recited here, is surely as authentic as anything we can now make out of Dr.
Bonhain's cause, or Chandelor v. Lopus.2 The case of Walking Coyote has carried its
pristine implications down the decades at least as well as that of Rylands v. Fletcher.3
The cases of Sleeping Rabbit, Medicine Bird, and Carries the Arrow may present per-
plexities; but not one of them can vie with, say, Dartmouth College v. Woodward4 or
Gibbons v. Ogden,s in telling contradictory things to a number of rather intelligent per-
sons. Name any case here-Broken Dishes, Shoots Left-Handed, She Bear, Big Laugh-
ing Wontan, Bull Head, or Which Will You Take-and you are on far firmer ground
than in wrestling with the resolution of a great constitutional issue, such as New State
Ice Co. v. Liebmann6 or Ashwander v. T.V.A.7
For the purpose oral tradition may even be an advantage. Here, as with the Roman
and the common law, the case is the thing. But its value lies, not in its statement, but
in its revelation of the command which prevails in the pinch. We are no longer serious-
ly interested in the personal fortunes of Ira Munn, O'Gorman and Young, Leo Nebbia,
as they did legal battle against the State of Illinois, the Hartford Insurance Co., and the
good People of New York. But we are mightily concerned with the tolerance accorded
by the state to the person in fixing the prices of the articles he sells. In a word, it
is the rule in Shelley's Case-or Hankering Wolf's or Tall White Man's-which we seek.
And to find it, we must remember that among the Cheyenne the law was not as yet a
differentiated institution. There was no priestcraft of attorneys, no judicial caste to
generate legalism, no corpus of professional lore to intrude upon common sense. The
stuff of judgment came from the people; the men who delivered sentences were busied
with everyday affairs. Under such conditions the very absence of literacy counted; for
it kept away from the intellectualizing touch of specialists a thing which belonged to
the folk. The cases set down here became fireside stuff; as tales they were told over
and over again; in their reiteration they remained true to the prevailing norms of jus-
tice. Thus they stand out, not as points upon which a series of doctrines is pivoted, but
as imperatives which stem from community life. Where literacy can provide no alibi,
the mind cannot afford to be inexact or sluggish. But if popular belief has departed
somewhat from what actually happened, it is of little consequence. The cases are more,
rather than less, reliable because of the way they have been handed down. It is the
law-in-action which the authors seek, and its hiding place is in tribal memory.
The result is an articulate duster of law-ways. Facts do not have feet with which to
walk into court; the norms with which men in conflict are judged are not created by
legal process. The law is pointed by the morality, decency, good taste of a people. If
the cases are few, there is at hand a whole culture to draw upon, to give setting, to sug-
gest leads, to provide check and cross-check. In each case it is the Chief, a bystander,
or the Group of Wise Men, who speaks; and the spokesman in a brilliant, competent, or
stupid way makes articulate the decision. It is an art, that of saying doom; and there
is need here--as with Iroquois, Maoris, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
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-for "the old man who speaks the straightest judgment." A fine art it is, for "a judg-
ment straight enough, though hard to speak, is unmistakable when spoken." The au-
thors quote Vinogradoff, who mournfully regrets, in respect to a primitive people, "we
do not know how, or by whom the merits of the different judgments were estimated."
The authors with a larger understanding retort, "read the Cheyenne material and you
do not need to know." Yes, the judge must make say the say that goes straight to the
heart of the dispute; but the experience and wisdom from which it is distilled belong
to the people. The use of techniques for focusing a whole culture upon the instance
here endows with sharp edges what would otherwise remain a small amorphous mass.
The law-ways set down are not a thing apart. For all their sharp definition they
cling close to tribal life. As with us, the trouble-case reveals the institution in tension;
as with us, the flash of insight as to the way out is shorthand for all that comes to judg-
ment. The absence of a priestcraft kept decision a homely, earthy, sweaty sort of
thing. Words do not carry over easily; but the law of the Cheyenne savors rather of
tort than of crime. Although the punitive note is not absent, the greater stress falls
upon the rehabilitation of the wrongdoer. Persons prone to offense are given public
office to sober them up and to develop a sense of responsibility. Property reveals only
faint outlines. As between persons rights are clearly defined only in respect to chattels;
and borrowing, especially of horses and for the occasion, is only on its way towards
being called stealing. The feast proclaimed the difficulties of hoarding; possessions
were much too personal to sustain any full-fledged institution of inheritance. At a
man's death his earthly goods were dissipated. He took his best suit and a miscellany
of necessities into the grave; the daughters, less adept than the sons at the craft of filch-
ing from the enemy, came in for the larger share; and even neighbors got a cut in on
the disappearing estate. Contract was known, though not overused; it was far from a
holy thing whose obligations were never to be impaired. Even the smoking of a pipe
in common was only to a degree promissory; there is little of long-time commitments
for a fixed fee. Virginity was hemmed in by taboos; divorce was easy; adultery in-
tolerable. Banishment was a device to rid the community of an anti-social element.
The exile-as outcast, fellow traveler, or penitent-was controlled by being denied the
blessings of society. The job of law was to groove behavior as well as to clear up messes;
and this it did almost with no reference to technically phrased rules.
Although Llewellyn and Hoebel talk of the Cheyenne, their minds are intent upon
our own law-ways. The abundance and intricacy of current material has made us
sharp on the doctrine, the rule, the mooted point. But the larger issues of office and
outline we are prone to neglect. Intent upon them and for want of a better laboratory,
the authors are driven back to the usages of a more direct people. The law, I take it,
must be at once remote and near.' It must be remote; for, if an imperative is to be im-
posed on a man, it cannot be at the will of another man. It must appear backed by the
weight of position or the voice of authority. It must be near; for it must make sense in
the situation in which it is applied-and that is impossible unless it is constantly recast
in response to a moving world. As change is inevitable, scope must be given to the
dynamic impulses of men who will not conform. As order is essential, a frontier of tol-
erance must be thrown about all human conduct. So there must be leeway, alike for the
judge and the judged, or the community cannot carry on. Rules must have a capacity
to flex; behavior, it's thus far and it's no farther. The zone of tolerance makes of judg-
ment an art and demands that the judge be a craftsman. His trade, which can exhibit
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
only its degree of perfection, must aim at the superlative. As a doctrine forsakes its
reason-to-be, it imposes the dead hand of restraint. As rules harden into a code, they
enslave where they are meant to serve. It has taken a brilliant use of a superb technique
for the authors to say that the life of the law is not observance, but function. They
merely profess to set down an objective account of the Cheyenne way; but you and
I know it is a sermon to the brethren of the American bar.
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Public Policy. Edited by Carl J. Friedricht and Edward S. Mason. Published by the
Graduate School of Public Administration, Harvard University Press, 1942. Pp.
xii, 39'. $3.50.
Perhaps it is because the reviewer is too rigidly bound by canons of academic logic
that he has extreme difficulty in tracing that thread of continuity which is usually
found in a book. Possibly, however, there is no reason to confine miscellaneous articles
to weekly, monthly, or quarterly magazines encased in paper covers. If not, here then
is a series of excellent articles on various topics pertaining to problems arising out of
the war (and one should add parenthetically that all deal with the social sciences) in
another edition of the "annual magazine" of the Harvard Graduate School of Public
Administration.
The first two articles deal with the question of war morale. In one of these, Gordon
Allport discusses the problem of morale and its measurement. His is a very good sur-
vey of the various kinds of evidence pertaining to national morale, such as the suicide
rate, mental illness, tax evasions, sabotage, and strikes, to name a few of the indices
which he enumerates and discusses. He concludes that it is not possible to add alge-
braically the assets and liabilities in national morale, but points out that it is possible
from empirical surveys to identify those factors which seem to be high and those which
seem to be low, and to plot trends over a period of time. In the second-of the articles on
morale, Edward L. Bernays discusses "The Integration of Morale." He defines morale
and outlines certain basic premises which underlie the building of a strong morale. He
points out the need for a broad integrated plan and states its achievement is not easy
because democracy means different things to different persons. In any case, it is impor-
tant in a democracy that persuasion should be through truth. Although much is now
being done by the public relations units of many government departments, there is no
master plan marked out by technicians drawn from the fields of the social sciences.
Technicians and experts in the physical sciences already advise on similar subjects,
and similar advantage should be taken of expert knowledge in the nonphysical fields.
In the most lengthy article in this "year book," David Riesman discusses "Civil
Liberties in a Period of Transition." He points out that we have been the inheritors of
a great liberal tradition which we have been inclined neither to challenge nor to adapt
to the radically changed conditions which confront us. Mr. Riesman discusses the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court cases dealing with freedom of speech and press, beginning
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